"Workers' settlements can be tapped for child support"

By Nanette A. McCarthy

Originally Published in
Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, 1997: March 24

Two Illinois Appellate Court districts recently reviewed whether a worker's entire settlement from a job-related injury constitutes income for purposes of determining child support. In each case, evidence--or a lack of evidence--that the settlement included factors outside of wages influenced the court's decision.
   In Villanueva v. O'Gara, 282 Ill.App.3d 147, 668 N.E.2d 589 (1996), the 2d District Appellate Court held that it was error to deem the whole settlement income and remanded the case for a determination of the non-wage components of the settlement. In Illinois Department of Public Aid ex rel. Jennings v. White, 1997 Ill.App. LEXIS 11 (1997), the 3d District ruled that the entire settlement should be considered income.
   Both decisions underscore the importance of not only understanding the components of a settlement award but obtaining the appropriate discovery to present this information properly to the court.
   Villanueva
   Around 1990, respondent Sean O'Gara injured his hand while at work. He eventually received a lump-sum settlement of $385,000 for his potential product liability claim. After attorney fees and costs were deducted, O'Gara received net proceeds of $251,665.
   Before settling, O'Gara was adjudged to be the father of Amanda Villanueva, born to petitioner Dolia Villanueva on April 27, 1987, and ordered to pay child support. After O'Gara received his personal-injury settlement, Dolia Villanueva petitioned for an increase in support based on the settlement award. Villanueva sought a one-time lump sum of 20 percent of the net settlement proceeds.
   The trial court agreed that the net settlement proceeds constituted income under section 505 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act and ordered O'Gara to deposit 20 percent of the amount, or $50,331, into a trust. The trial court did not apportion the damages between the different elements of damages recoverable in personal-injury torts. On appeal, O'Gara argued that the trial court erroneously found that the entire personal-injury settlement constituted income for purposes of child support.
   The 2d District Appellate Court began its analysis by attempting to define "net income" for purposes of child support. Section 505(a) of the Marriage Act simply defines "net income" as income from all sources, minus a list of specified deductions. The court determined that "income," as contemplated by section 505(a), is undefined. The court then considered the legislative intent and noted that income generally represents gain or profit. It is ordinarily understood to be a return on investment of labor or capital.
   By contrast, personal-injury awards serve to make an injured party whole, in effect restoring one to the status quo before the injury was suffered. The court noted that O'Gara was not any richer as a result of the settlement but was made whole. The Appellate Court agreed with O'Gara that the personal-injury award may have included the compensation for the following:
  • Disability and disfigurement resulting from the injury.
  • Pain and suffering.
  • The reasonable expense of necessary medical care, treatment and services.
  • The present and future value of lost earnings.

   Holding that the first three factors are designed to make a party whole, the court remanded the case for a determination of what portion of the settlement was or should have been apportioned to the fourth factor, replacing present and future lost earnings.
   White
   Respondent Rodney White received a settlement award after injuring his back while working for the Burlington Northern Railroad in June 1992. Rodney filed suit under the Federal Employers Liability Act against his employer, and in September 1995, his case settled for $200,000. Before the settlement, White was adjudged to be the father of Cody Jennings, who was born to petitioner Jacquelynn Jennings on Oct. 17, 1989. After White received his award, the Illinois Department of Public Aid filed a petition to modify White's child support obligation based on his increased income from the FELA settlement.
   Before trial, a special assistant state's attorney filed two requests to produce, seeking documents that would support a breakdown of the FELA award. White never complied with the requests. Later at trial, White testified that the entire FELA award was for pain and suffering. When asked if any documentation supported his claim, White said he thought so but that the papers were probably with his other attorney or at home.
   The trial judge apparently was reluctant to rely solely on White's testimony because he failed to produce any supporting documents. As a result, the judge continued the hearing to allow both parties to submit documentation concerning the break down of the settlement.
   White's attorney eventually submitted three documents: a letter from his client's FELA attorney indicating that the settlement covered only lost wages loss; a settlement statement showing case expenses and disbursements; and Burlington Northern's release of all claims.
   The trial court concluded that the entire award, less expenses, constituted income for purposes of child support. The court pointed out that no breakdown of the award was specified; however, one of the deductions included a mandatory contribution to the Railroad Retirement Board. This implied the award was for lost wages because the deduction is normally a wage deduction. The trial court ordered White to pay a lump sum percentage of the total award (less expenses) for division between the Department of Public Aid and the mother.
   White appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in concluding that the FELA award constituted income for purposes of child support.
   As in Villanueva, the White court noted that the act does not define "income" for purposes of child support and reviewed the legislative intent for assistance. Several cases construing the language of section 505 broadly applied the term "income" to include various items such as tax return refunds, severance pay and one-time income. The court next compared the language of section 505 with the language in section 503 as described in In re Marriage of DeRossett, 173 Ill.2d 416, 671 N.E.2d 654 (1996). The DeRossett court concluded that a workers' compensation award, arising out of a claim accrued during the marriage, is marital property because section 503 presumes that all property acquired during the marriage is marital property. Likewise the 3d District Appellate Court broadly defined "income" for child support purposes as all income, unless specifically excluded by statute.
   The appeals court considered White's argument that the case should be remanded pursuant to Villanueva to determine the apportionment of his FELA award. However, without addressing the merits of the Villanueva decision, the court held that remand was unnecessary because the trial court already had given White numerous opportunities to produce the evidence necessary to show that the award was for something other than lost wages.